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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE PRIDE CLUB, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., ) 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
12066 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action instigated 
against the State of Utah to have certain sections of 
the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 and the Private 
Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act of 1969 declared uncon-
stitutional. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
On March 17, 1970, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
Judge, District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, granted defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGlIT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the summary judg-
ment against them and a determination that§§ 16-6-13.1, 
16-6-13.5, and 16-6-13.7 Utah Code Ann. 1969, and 
all interrelated sections of the Private Nonprofit Locker 
Clubs Act of 1969 an,d the Liquor Control Act of 1969, 
are unconstitutional and, therefore, void. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants instituted this declaratory judgment 
action against the respondents to have certain sections 
of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 and the Private 
Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act of 1969 declared uncon-
stitutional, and to have the respondents enjoined from 
enforcing these sections. The respondents contended 
that these sections were not unconstitutional and moved 
the court for a summary judgment dismissing the 
action. Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted the 
respondents' motion. Appellants now appeal the sum-
mary judgment against them. 
2 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
~ 16-6-13.7 UTAH CODE ANN. (1969) VIO-
LATES THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY 
THE F 0 UR TH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION THAT PEOPLE SHALL BE 
SAFE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES. 
alia: 
§ 16-6-13.7 Utah Code Ann. (1969) provides, inter 
( 9) ... Any member of the council, the commis-
sion or any peace officer or investigator or ex-
aminer authorized by the commission, the council 
or the director of the liquor division of the de-
partment of public safety, shall, upon presenta-
tion of his credentials, be admitted immediately 
to the clubhouse or club quarters and permitted 
without hindrance or delay, to inspect com-
pletely the entire clubhouse, club quarters, and 
all books and records of the licensee, at any time 
during which the same are open for . the trans-
action of business to its members, and each mem-
ber utilizing, or claiming the right to utilize, a 
locker as provided in subdivision ( 18) of this 
section, shall be deemed to agree and consent to 
permit any such person to be admitted and to 
inspect the contents of his locker. 
The above statute compels all incorporated private 
nonprofit liquor locker clubs of Utah to waive the neces-
sity of a search warrant and permit inspections of their 
premises, all their books and records, and the private 
3 
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lockers of their members whenever any "member of 
the council, the commission or any peace officer or in-
vestigator or examiner authorized by the commission, 
the council or the director of the liquor division" de-
cides to make such a search. The practical effect of 
this system is to leave the occupant subject to the whim-
sical discretion of the official in the field, and this is 
precisely the discretion to invade private property that 
the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523,' 532-33 
(1967). 
The United States Supreme Court has been very 
active in striking down legislation that allows such war-
rantless searches. In Camara v. Municipal Courl, supra, 
the Court invalidated an ordinance that permitted 
warrantless searches by department of public health 
inspectors. The Court emphasized its distaste for such 
searches because it chose to overrule its ear lier deci-
sion in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959) while 
being fully aware that it could invalidate this legislation 
and let Frank stand. The Frank case upheld a war· 
rantless search by a health inspector because the ordi-
nance required that the inspector "have cause to suspect 
that a nuisance exists." The ordinance in Camara, how-
ever, had no such requirement for cause. Justice White, 
in speaking for the majority, was aware of this and 
also that both the Camara and Frank ordinances 
only al1;owed "reasonalble inspections." (See 387 
U. S. at 529, 531, & n. 4.) The Supreme Court, how· 
ever, chose to overrule Frank, even though it was 
4 
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not necessary to do so, and declared these warrantless 
inspections unconstitutional. 
In the instant case, the state argued in the lower 
court that the warrant process could not function effec-
tively in this field and, therefore, warrants should not 
be required. The same argument was proposed in the 
Camara case and led the Supreme Court to state: 
In our opinion, these arguments unduly dis-
cdunt the purposes behind the warrant machin-
ery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment ... 
These are questions which may be reviewed by 
a neutral magistrate without any reassessment 
of the basic agency decision to canvass an area 
.... The practical effect of this system is to leave 
the occupant subject to the discretion of the 
official in the field. This is precisely the discre-
tion to invade private property which we have 
consistently circumscribed by a requirement that 
a disinterested party warrant the need to search. 
387 U. S. at 532-33. 
In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the 
Supreme Court applied the Camara rule to laws per-
mitting warrantless searches of private commercial struc-
tures. See involved an ordinance that allowed the fire 
chief to enter all buildings and premises, except dwell-
ings, as often as necessary for the purpose of ascertain-
ing and causing to be corrected any conditions liable 
to cause a fire. In holding that this law was just as 
noxious as the one in Ca mar a, the Court said: 
The businessman, like the occupant of a resi-
dence, has a constitutional right to go about his 
5 
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business free from unreasonable official entries 
upon his private commercial property. The busi-
nessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy 
if the decision to enter and inspect for violation 
of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by 
the inspector in the field without official author-
ity evidenced by a warrant. 387 U. S. at 543. 
In this regard, the nature of private social clubs 
in Utah becomes important. Such a club is a nonprofit 
association of various citizens who have some common 
interest. In many instances that common interest may 
be no more than a desire to have a place in which mem-
bers may entertain their friends or business associates 
without resort to permitting consumption of intoxicat-
ing liquor in the presence of the children in their homes. 
Clearly, many, if not all, private club members look 
upon their club as an extension of their living room, 
family room, or recreation room. How much more pri-
vate these clubs are than the commercial warehouse 
involved in the See easel If a warrantless search of a 
commercial warehouse by a fire chief looking for fire 
hazards is an unreasonable invasion of a person's pri-
vacy, how can one seriously argue that a warrantless 
search of a private club by police officers looking for 
criminal violations is not? Yet, this is what the state 
proposes. 
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court 
decided the Camara and See cases, the Utah Supreme 
Court decided a case directly in point with this one, 
and it is controlling here. In VagabondClub v. Salt Lake 
City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P. 2d 691 (1968), a Salt 
6 
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Lake City ordinance which allowed the police to do 
the very same thing that section 16-6-13.7 allows en-
forcement officers to do was declared unconstitutional 
because it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution. The relevant 
provisions of that ordinance were § 20-29-20 and § 20-
29-7 which provided: 
§ 20-29-20: 
Any peace officer shall have the right to enter 
the club room, meeting rooms, premises and facil-
ities of non-profit clubs for the purpose of deter-
mining whether any laws or ordinances are being 
violated therein and in the case of clubs holding 
Class "B" or Class "C" licenses, the police de-
partment shall make periodic inspections of said 
premises and report its findings to the Board of 
Commissioners. 
§ 20-29-7: 
If the association allows the consumption of beer 
or liquor on the premises and the entrance to the 
premises is by key or other device, such a key 
or device must be supplied to the chief of police. 
In this case the Utah Supreme Court held: 
In the instant action, the provisions of the ordi-
nance which compel the clubs to provide a key 
to the police, permit inspections for violations 
of the law and waive the necessity of a warrant, 
proscribe the safeguards of the Fourth and 
I'"ourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of 
the United States and are therefore unconsti-
tutional. 
7 
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It is most enlightening to compare the above un-
constitutional ordinances with the instant statute, which 
provides that any peace officer or otherwise authorized 
investigator shall be admitted immediately and per-
mitted without hindrance or delay to inspect completely 
the entire premises, all books and records, and all con-
tents of the members' individual lockers. Indeed, such 
a search infringes more upon one's privacy and is more 
unreasonable than the search authorized by the uncon-
stitutional Salt Lake City ordinances. 
The respondents tried to distinguish Vagabond 
Club v. Salt Lake City from the instant case because 
the city ordinances required a key be given the chief 
of police if a key were the normal means of the mem-
bers' entrance into the club. However, since this case 
was argued in the lower court, this court has decided 
a case that totally emasculates this argument. In Salt 
Lake City v. Wheeler, et al., No. 11855, March 25, 
1970, the police without a warrant made a search of a 
tavern pursuant to an ordinance which provided that 
" [ t }he police department shall be permitted to and 
have access to all premises licensed or applying for 
license under this chapter, and shall make periodic 
inspections of said premises and report its findings to 
the board of commissioners." In striking down this ordi-
nance, Justice Henriod, speaking for the majority of 
this court, said: 
Another might answer that what with the re-
stricted number of licenses issued and the com-
parative ease of obtaining a search warrant 
8 
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where an establishment may be suspect, what is 
wrong or onerous about requiring such a war-
rant? It would seem that enlightened peace offi-
cers would prefer such procedure in order to 
innoculate themselves against possible nuisance 
litigation. 
Withal that is said above, we believe and con-
clude that our own recent decision in Vagabond 
Club v. Salt Lake City is dispositive of the in-
stant case. There the city ordinance required 
that the proprietor furnish a key to the police 
department for the purpose of entering and "in-
specting" the premises. We concluded that it 
was offensive to the Fourth Amendment, citing 
with approval Camara v. Municipal Court, and 
See v. Seattle, which struck down similar legis-
lation presuming to permit warrantless "inspec-
tions." The only substantial difference between 
the Vagabond case and this case, is that in the 
former the proprietor was required to furnish the 
police with a key to unlock the door at any tim~ 
from the outside, while in the instant case the 
ordinance requires the proprietor to unlock the 
door at any time from the inside, - all to ac-
complish the same objective-a look-see of all 
the premises. We are not constrained to overrule 
the Vagabond case. 
The same warrantless "look-see" of all the premises 
is the objective of the instant statute and the precedent 
of Vagabond and Salt Lake City dictates their uncon· 
stitutionality. 
Also, in the lower court in the instant case, the 
respondents tried to cloud the search and seize issue 
with an extensive discussion of the old "privilege versus 
9 
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right" semantic problem. (For a criticism of the useful-
ness of this doctrine see: Van Alstyne, The Demise 
of the Privilege-Right Distinction in Coristitutional 
Law. 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 ( 1968). Basically, the re-
spondents contended that they are granting free citi-
zens the privilege of organizing a social club and main-
taining rooms for that social club, and that those free 
citizens niust sacrifice the constitutional right against 
an unreasonable search and seizure for that privi-
lege. This is exactly the same argument that Salt 
Lake City proposed and this court rejected in Vaga-
bond Club v. Salt Lake City, supra, (see Points IV 
and V of their brief). Of course, one may contract 
away or waive a constitutional right, but this presup· 
poses a freedom of bargaining. Here the respondents 
are coercing the appellants to give up their constitu· 
tional rights in an all or nothing agreement. This is 
at best an unconscionable bargain in a contract of 
adhesion and obviously not a voluntary waiver of a con· 
stitutional right. 
In support of their contention, the respondents 
argued that since one could consent to a self-incrimi· 
nating blood test for the privilege of a driver's license, 
he could consent to an unreasonable search to obtain 
liquor privileges. Ignoring the fact that the situation 
of drinking and driving makes this distinguishable, it 
is important to note that the cases cited by the state 
(State v. Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 47, 395 P. 2d 539 (1964); 
State v. Robinson, 23 Utah 2d 78, 457 P. 2d 969 
(1969)) do not support this point. In Bryan the ap· 
1-0 
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pellant gave an actual, not implicit, consent at the time 
the test was given, and Robinson was dismissed on 
procedural grounds. The Utah Supreme Court has not 
ruled on the constitutionality of "implied consent" to 
a blood test and the validity of any other courts holding 
it constitutional is presently in doubt since the foun-
dation of these decisions, Breihthaupt v. Abram, 352 
U. S. 448 (1957), was based on Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U. S. 25 ( 1949), which was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 u. s. 643 (1961). 
The respondents also cited several first amendment 
cases where one could not work at certain jobs without 
having his absolute freedom of speech limited. We need 
not point out to the court that the very nature of free 
expression, unlike search and seizure, requires a judicial 
balancing process. E.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Comm., 372, U. S. 539 (1963). Ever 
since Justice Holmes first expressed the "clear and 
present danger" test, we have realized over and over 
that to allow someone to express his opinions without 
restraint limits the freedom of choice of others. It is 
because of this that the courts will not allow certain 
individuals to advocate overthrow of our government 
and still accept certain employment privileges from it. 
The means of analysis used in freedom of expression 
cases simply has not, and logically should not, be ap-
plied when an individual's protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures is involved. To grant one 
individual immunity from an unreasonable search is 
not going to limit another's immunity. We are not here 
11 
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concerned with the First Amendment, and no amount 
of "privilege versus right" verbiage is going to occlude 
the fact that th~ respondents here seek to impose a war-
rantless, unreasonable search upon the private premises 
of certain, but not all, of its populace. The ordinance at 
issue in Salt Lake City v. Wheeler, et al., supra, required 
the same type of "consent" for the "privilege" of a 
tavern license, and this court held that ordinance un-
constitutional. 
The respondents contend that all they have to do is 
have something declared a "privilege," and not a 
"right," and then they may legislate away all related 
constitutional safeguards. The danger of this logic of 
semantics is horribly obvious. We know that one cannot 
shout " 'fire' in a crowded theater." Does this mean that 
we have a right to some free speech and only a privi-
lege to others? Where does the right end and the privi-
lege begin? Every citizen has a right to associate freely 
in the premises of his own private club. The respondents 
would have us believe he does not, for secton 16-6-13.7 
( 9) requires all members to consent to unreasonable 
searches for the privilege of membership. Is it a privi-
lege to have city fire, police, and garbage services? Why 
not require that residents consent to all warrantless 
searches for the privilege of living in a city? 
No fancy words can obscure the bald-faced fact 
that our constitution prohibits unreasonable searches; 
yet, the instant statute permits them. Therefore, §16-
6-13.7 Utah Code Ann. (1969) is unconstitutional 
12 
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and unenforceable because it is subordinate to and in 
conflict with the Fourth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution, which provides that the inhabitants of 
this country are to be secure from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF 
LOCAL CONSENT RELATING TO THE 
SALE OR DISPENSING OF INTOXICATING 
LIQUORS IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE BECAUSE NO STANDARDS, LIMI-
TATIONS, OR GUIDELINES EXIST AS TO 
HOW OR WHEN SUCH CONSENT IS TO BE 
GRANTED, DENIED, SUSPENDED, OR 
REVOKED. 
The Utah Private Non profit Locker Clubs Act of 
1969 contains many restrictions on where intoxicating 
liquors may be stored, served and sold. One of these 
requirements is that the local authorities must give 
their written consent to the proposed use of any par-
ticular premises before this becomes legal. The follow-
ing statutes ref er to the necessity of this "local consent:" 
§ 16-6-13.1 (6) Utah Code Ann. (1969): 
Any social club, recreational, athletic, or ?ther 
kindred association seeking to have a state hquor 
store located on its premises, shall have a valid 
license issued by the Utah liquor control com-
13 
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mission, file a written application with the com-
mission in t~e form prescribed, accompanied by 
. . . the written consent of the local authority 
as defined in the Utah Liquor Control Act of 
1969 .... 
§ 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann. (1969): 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter and 
th~ Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 and regu-
lations promulgated thereunder, a Utah liquor 
control commission, with consent of the local 
authority, as defined in the Utah Liquor Control 
act of 1969 shall have authority to issue a license 
to a social club, recreational, athletic, or kindred 
association, incorporated under the provisions of 
this chapetr, which maintains or intends to main-
tain premises upon which liquor is or will be 
stored, consumed or sold as hereinafter provided, 
except that no license shall be issued to any club 
or association which establishes or intends to es-
tablish such premises in the immediate proximity 
of any existing school, church, library, public 
playground or park. 
It appears from the above statute that no club may 
sell, serve, or allow storage and conswnption of liquor 
on their premises without the consent of the local 
authorities. The persons who have the authority to give 
the consent for any particular locality are defined in 
section 32-1-3 Utah Code Ann. (1969). That, however, 
is as far as the legislature's guidelines on this require-
ment extend. There are no provisions of Utah law that 
prescribe any standards, limitations, or guidelines to 
be followed by the local authorities in granting, deny-
ing, suspending, or revoking their consent. In requiring 
14 
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l 
this "local consent," the legislature left all such club:; 
at the mercy of the local authority's whimsical discre-
tion. This discretion remains completely unlimited to 
this day; and in fact, no communities have even tried 
to enact ordinances or otherwise notify the populace 
as to what their local authorities will use as a standard 
in determining if consent is to be given. The existence 
of such a vague requirement precludes due process of 
law and permits discriminatory and unequal treatment 
of those similarly situated. 
A vague local consent ordinance remarkably simi-
lar to the instant statute was held unconstitutional in the 
landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 
( 1886) . This early expression of the Supreme Court's 
distaste of vague laws concerned the following San 
Francisco ordinance : 
It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage 
of this order, for any person or persons to estab-
lish, maintain or carry on a laundry within the 
corporate limits of the City and County of San 
Francisco without having first obtained the con-
sent of the board of supervisors .... 
This ordinance was used by the local authorities to 
discriminate against those of Chinese descent who were 
in the laundry business. Since in Y ick W o there was evi-
dence of actual discrimination the Court did not have to 
decide the case on just the existence of a vague law. 
However, even at that early date, the Court left no 
doubt as to its reaction to laws that bytheir vagueness 
grant unlimited discretion to administrative officials. 
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For, the very idea that one man may be com-
pelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or 
any material right essential to the enjoyment 
of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be 
intolerable in any country where freedom pre-
vails, as being the essence of slavery itself. 118 
u. s. 370. 
Yick Wo clearly demonstrates how easy it is to un-
fairly administer a law similar to the statutes in question. 
It is because of this potential for unequal treatment, 
coupled with the lack of notice, that the Supreme Court 
since Yick Wo has been so harsh on vague statutes. The 
Court no longer waits for a vague law to be administered 
unjustly. Time after time is has held such laws uncon-
stitutional, concluding that "a statute which either for-
bids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates 
the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. 
General Const. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 ( 1925) (cases 
cited). The Court has considered the effect of vague 
laws in practically all areas of the law and simply sum-
marized its position by stating: "Vague laws in any 
area suffer constitutional infirmity." Ashton v. Ken-
tucky, 384 U. S. 195, 200 {1966) (citing, International 
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216; Collins v. 
Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634; United States v. Cohen Gro-
cery Co., 255 U. S. 81; Connally v. General Construc-
tion Co., 269 U. S. 385; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 
U. S. 445; Smith v. Ca;hoon, 283 U. S. 553; Champlin 
Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210; Lanzetta v. 
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New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451; Wright v. Georgia, 373 
U. S. 284; Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399. Cf. 
Scull v. Virginia, 359 U. S. 344; Raley v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 423.) (Emphasis added.). 
The absence of standards or guidelines to prevent 
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment has been the 
precise reason for the Supreme Court to conclude a 
statute unconstitutionally vague. In Giaccio v. State of 
Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 401 (1966), a state statute 
authorized juries to impose at their discretion, and with-
out standards or guidelines, the cost of criminal prosecu-
tion of the defendant. The Court's opinion in holding 
this statute unconstitutional is set out at length below: 
We agree with the trial court and the dissent-
ing judges in the appellate courts below th~t 
the 1860 Act is invalid under the Due Process 
Clause because of vagueness and the absence 
of any standards sufficient to enable defendants 
to protect themselves against arbitrary and dis-
criminatory imposition of costs .... Both lib-
erty and property are specifically protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment against any state 
deprivation which does not meet the standards 
of due process, and this protection is not to be 
avoided by the simple label a State chooses to 
fasten upon its conduct or its statute. So here 
this state Act whether labeled "penal" or not 
must meet the challenge that it is unconstitutio~­
ally vague. It is established that a law fails to 
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause 
if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves 
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits 
or leaves judges and jurors free to decide with-
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out any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited 
and what is not in each particular case. See, e.g., 
LanzBtta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 
59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888; Baggett v. Bullitt, 
377 U. S. 360, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 12 L. Ed. ~d 377. 
This 1860 Pennsylvania Act contains no stand-
ards at all, nor does it place any conditions of 
any kind upon the jury's power to impose costs 
upon a defendant who has been found by the 
jury to be not guilty of a crime charged against 
him. The Act, without imposing a single con-
dition, limitation or contingency on a jury which 
has acquitted a defendant simply says the jurors 
"shall determine, by their verdict, whether * * * 
the defendant shall pay the costs" whereupon the 
trial judge is told he "shall forthwith pass sen-
tence to that effect, and order him [defendant] 
to be committed to the jail of the county" there 
to remain until he either pays or gives security 
for the costs. Certainly one of the basic purposes 
of the Due Process Clause has always been to 
protect a person against having the Governll!ent 
impose burdens upon him except in accordance 
with the valid laws of the land. Implicit in this 
constitutional safeguard is the premise that the 
law must be one that carries an understandable 
meaning with legal standards that courts must 
enforce. This state Act as written does not even 
begin to meet this constitutional requirement. 
The total absence of guidelines that made the stat-
ute in Giaccio unconstitutionally vague is just as obvious 
in the Utah statutes. The Utah Legislature stated ab-
solutely no standards, nor did it place any conditions or 
limitations of any kind on the power of the local author-
ities to grant their consent to one applicant and withhold 
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it from another. It was precisely this kind of unlimited 
discretion that was held unconstitutional in Giaccio. 
This Court has also held laws which give unguided 
discretion to some administrative unit invalid. This type 
of law has usually been treated in Utah as an unlawful 
delegation of power, which is often just another way of 
saying that due process is denied. When a statute or 
ordinance grants the power to some administrative unit 
to determine its action by the facts found, it grants a 
"quasi-judicial" power (State Ta.x Comm'n of Utah v. 
Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 413, 62 P. 2d 120 (1936)); and 
whenever power of a judicial character is exercised, the 
requirements of due process must be enforced. 
In Jones v. Logan City, 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P. 
2d 160 ( 1967) , this Court struck down an ordinance that 
imposed upon an administrative unit "quasi-judicial" 
functions without standards or guidelines to govern it. 
In that case the law in question permitted the local board 
of condemnation to declare what a public nuisance was 
without any restrictions or limitations on the board's 
discretion. Aware that to uphold such an ordinance 
would deny due process, this court stated: 
Ordinance No. 120 above referred to, which 
grants to the Board of Condemnation the right 
to determine whether any building constitutes 
a menace to public health or public safety does 
not provide standards on which the Board can 
base its finding as to what is or what is not a 
menace to public health or public safety. It 
would appear that the ordinance imposes upon 
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the Board of Condemnation quasi-judicial func-
tions without standards or guidelines to govern 
the Board in its determination. [People ex rel. 
Gamber v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377, 
378; State v. Keller, 108 Neb. 7 42, 189 N. W. 
374, 25 A. L. R. 115; Rowland v. State ex rel. 
Martin, 129 Fla. 662, 176 So. 545, 114 A. L. R. 
443 and annotations p. 446.} We are of the 
opinion that the ordinance attempts to make an 
unlawful delegation of power to the City's Board 
of Condemnation. We are of the opinion that by 
reason of the delegation of powers by the City 
Commission the ordinance above referred to is 
invalid. [State Tax Commission of Utah v. 
J(atsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P. 2d 120, 107 A. L. R. 
1477.] 
The delegatioin of power to local authorities to 
allow or prevent the otherwise legal use of any particu-
lar premises must be held an unlawful delegation of 
power for the same reason that the ordinance in Jones 
was held unlawful. In Jones there were no standards to 
guide the board of condemnation in its determination of 
nuisances and here there are no standards to guide the 
local authorities in their determination of consent. In 
this instance the local officials are granted a quasi-judi-
cial function, for the legislature obviously intended that 
they assess the facts and determine their action by the 
facts. To assume otherwise would be to assume the leg-
islature intended that local authority grant, deny, sus-
pend, or revoke an uninformed and capricious consent. 
Therefore, local consent is not a mere ministerial func-
tion, and there must be legislative guidelines which 
meet constitutional standards. State Tax Comm'n of 
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Utah v. f(atsis, supra. In granting to executive officials 
the power to exercise their discretion over the property 
rights of others, due process demands that this discre-
tion be limited. The statutes in question confer a pro-
nounced power on the local authorities to grant, deny, 
suspend, or revoke property rights to others. This dele-
gation of power is unlimited and, therefore, unconstitu-
tional. These statutes must be held invalid and unen-
forceable. 
Finally, Utah Const. art. I, § 24 demands that: 
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform opera-
tion." This provision, in addition to the requirement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, is a safeguard against any laws in Utah that 
permit discriminatory application. .Abrahamsen v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n, 3 Utah 2d 289, 
283 P. 2d 213 ( 1955) ; State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
p. 2d 920 ( 1938) . 
In the instant case, the legislature has passed a gen-
eral law to regulate where liquor may be stored, served, 
consumed, and sold within the state. Yet, all of these 
determinations are dependent upon the unlimited dis-
cretion of each of the 231 local authorities within the 
State of Utah. The legislature provided no means to 
insure any uniform operation of these laws of a general 
nature. 
The practical effect of granting this power to local 
officials without any guidelines or standards is to let the 
personal whims of these officials determine the law's 
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application. It is easy to assume that this grant of power 
could result in left-handed prohibition in certain com-
munities simply because the local authorities choose not 
to give their consent to anybody. "In the beginning" of 
these 1969 liquor laws, this actually happened in Utah 
County which even now is limited to but one such con-
sent having been given to the Alpine Country Club. 
Where like results are not evidenced, the fact remains 
that what one official in one community will look for, 
another in a different community will not. There is 
nothing to prevent one official from using totally arbi-
trary and invidious reasons for granting, denying, sus-
pending, or revoking consent, or to prevent inconsistent, 
arbitrary, and invidious discrimination. 
If the legislature intended to have prohibition or 
local option, it would have so provided. As it is, the 
power it vested in the local authorities not only results 
in a form of local option, but also precludes the uniform 
application of the Private Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act 
of 1969. Therefore, these statutes are also in violation 
of Utah Const. art: I, § 24, as well as in violation of U. 
S. Const. amends. V and XIV. 
POINT III 
§ § 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5 UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1969) DENY DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN 
THAT NO HEARINGS ARE PROVIDED FOR 
IN THE GRANTING, DENYING, SUSPEND-
ING, OR REVOKING OF LOCAL CONSENT; 
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NOR ARE ANY HEARINGS PROVIDED FOR 
THE GRANTING OR DENYING OF A LI-
CENSE BY THE UTAH STATE LIQUOR 
CONTROL COMMISSION. 
§§ 16-6-13.5 and 16-6-13.1 Utah Code Ann. 
(1969) (quoted in Point II of this brief) authorize 
three crucial administrative determinations as to whether 
a private club will obtain and keep a state liquor license. 
~ 16-6-13.5 authorizes the Utah State Liquor Control 
Commission to license these clubs with several condi-
tions, and one of the conditions, as set forth in both § ~ 
16-6-13.5 and 16-6-13.1 Utah Code Ann. (1969), is 
that the club have the consent of the local authorities to 
operate in the local area. Reading §§ 16-6-13.1 and 16-
6-13.5 Utah Code Ann. ( 1969) together, it becomes 
clear that three distinct administrative proceedings may 
take place that substantially affect the property rights 
of the clubs and their members. These proceedings are: 
first, the granting or denying of local consent; second, 
the granting or denying of a license; and third, the sus-
pension or revocation of local consent. All three of these 
administrative determinations take place without any 
kind of a hearing. Here we have governmental agencies 
making binding determinations as to the property rights 
of others without even the most basic of procedural safe-
guards. This practice denies due process of law. 
The most definitive statement on the requirements 
of due process in administrative procedure is the United 
States Supreme Court case of Hawnah v. Larche, 363 
C. S. 420 (1960). The often-quoted rule for determin-
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ing when due process procedures are necessary is found 
on page 442 of the majority's opinion: 
Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate 
or make binding determinations which directly 
affect the legal rights of individuals, it is im-
perative that those agencies use the procedures 
which have traditionally been associated with 
the judicial process. On the other hand, when 
governmental action does not partake of an ad-
judication, as for example, when a general fact-
finding investigation is being conducted, it is 
not necessary that the full panoply of judicial 
procedure be used. 
If an administrative body acts other than as a fact 
finder, i.e., if it finds facts and makes a determination 
based on them, its action takes on a quasi-judicial nature 
and the necessity of procedural safeguards attaches. 
Although some justices believe the scope of pro-
cedural safeguards in administrative actions should be 
much broader than in Hannaih, (see the dissenting opin-
ions of Justices Black and Douglas in Hannah v. 
Larche, supra, and their concurring opinions in Jenkins 
v. McKeithen, infra) the Court recently reaffirmed this 
rule while declaring the practices of the Louisiana 
Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry in violation 
of due process. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411 
(1969). In Jenkins, the state statute authorized an ad-
ministrative agency to do more than just gather facts to 
aid legislation. Rather, it allowed the agency to make its 
own determination of guilt and "brand individuals" in 
the eyes of the publie. 395 U. S. at 427-28. Since the act 
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that provided the agency with this power also limited 
the right of cross-examination and the presentation of 
evidence in one's own behalf, the Court concluded that 
due process was violated, and the statute was unconsti-
tional. 395 U. S. at 428-32. 
A case very analogous to the present one was de-
cided by this court in Morris v. Public Service Comm'n, 
7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P. 2d 644 (1958). In that case, Ap-
pellant Watson had a certificate of convenience and 
necessity to operate as a common carrier, and he wanted 
to have it transferred to Appellant Morris by the usual 
procedure of having the Utah State Public Service 
Commission issue Morris a new certificate and revoke 
his old one. The commission had a hearing at which both 
appellants were present for the sole purpose of deciding 
whether or not they should grant Morris the operating 
rights of Watson. After the hearing the commission not 
only denied the application to Morris, but it revoked 
Watson's existing certificate. This court, in overturning 
both decisions, concluded that Watson had never had 
notice or a proper hearing to determine the revocation of 
this pro,perty right and, therefore, he was denied due 
process of law. 
The legislature has recognized the value of a liquor 
license and that procedural safeguards are just as im-
portant to this property right as they are in the type of 
property right involved in Morris. § 16-6-13.11 Utah 
Code Ann. ( 1969) requires a public hearing before the 
liquor control commission may revoke, refuse to renew, 
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or suspend for more than thirty days any license that it 
issues. The legislature, however, overlooked the fact that 
since no hearings were required for the granting of local 
consent, this procedural safeguard could be circumvent-
ed. The local authorities have interpreted §§ 16-6-13.1 
and 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann. ( 1969) to mean that 
they may whimsically revoke their consent, as well as 
grant it, and the liquor control commission considers any 
revocation of local consent conclusive grounds for li-
cense revocation. What good is the public hearing pro-
vided by § 16-6-13.11 Utah Code Ann. (1969) if the 
only issue involved has been conclusively decided by a 
subordinate agency without a hearing? 
The legislature also overlooked the necessity of a 
hearing for the liquor control commission's determina-
tion of whether or not to grant a license. The property 
value of a liquor license is no less when it is being granted 
than it is when it is being revoked. To be logically con-
sistent, the legislature should have required a hearing 
whenever a determination of a club's license application 
is to be made. Of course, to satisfy the requirements of 
due process, a hearing must be held. 
When a statute or ordinance grants the power to 
some administrative unit to determine its action by the 
facts found by that administrative unit, that statute or 
ordinance grants a "quasi-judicial" power. State Ta.i: 
Comm'n of Utah v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 413, 62 P. ~ 
120 ( 1936) . This is the same power expressed in Han-
nah v. Larche, supra, as the power of a governmental 
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1 
agency to "adjudicate or make binding determinations 
which directly affect the legal rights of others." 
When local officials consent to a certain club's ap-
plication for a liquor license, or revoke such consent, and 
when the liquor control commission decides to grant or 
deny a license to any particular club, a binding deter-
mination of a judicial nature is made. When an agency 
has this quasi-judicial function the most basic of pro-
cedural safeguards must be required. An applicant must 
be able to present his own case and confront the wit-
nesses against him. 
§§ 16-6-13.l and 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann. 
( 1969) permit administrators to sit behind closed doors 
and make these crucial determinations without the indi-
vidual most affected by their decision even being able 
' to know their reasons, let alone present his case. This is 
not due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully con-
tended that the summary judgment against appellants 
be reversed and §§ 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.5, and 16-6-13.7 
Utah Code Ann. ( 1969) and all other interrelated sec-
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tions of the Private Nonprofit Locker Clubs Act of 
1969 and the Liquor Control Act of 1969 be declared un-
constitutional, void, and unenforceable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
410 Empire Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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